Backer, Larry Catá Opening Statement

Democratic Centralism in the Xi Jinping New Era

Larry Catá Backer

Prepared for the Roundtable: Socialist Rule of Law and Governance after the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress 13 March 2018

Short Version

The recent amendments to the Constitutions of the Communist Party and to the State Constitution in the wake of the 19^th Congress of the CPC evidence another great leap forward in the theory and practice of collective leadership by a vanguard party that has moved beyond its initial revolutionary stages and institution building stages. The amendments suggest both continuity and development of the key Leninist concept—democratic centralism. Democratic centralism has been the lynchpin of the development of Chinese Leninism over the course of its three eras of historical development. Those three eras, the Mao Zedong Era (1949-1978), the Deng Xiaoping Era (1978-2018) and the Xi Jinping Era (from 2018) put democratic centralism at the center of the working style of the CPC, of the relationship between core and collective within the CPCP, and of the relation of the two with the people through the mass line and the operation of the state apparatus.

At the center of this understanding of democratic centralism was the evolution of the relationship between the collective and the core—between the masses and the CPC, between CPC cadres and the CPC leadership, between the leadership of the central committee and its members, and so on repeated endlessly as the core organizational principle of state, Party, society and economics. These notions were bound up in principles of the mass line. Thus democratic centralism and the mass line expressed the same Leninist principle directed both inward, to the CPC, and outward, to the masses. Most importantly, as democratic centralism it also instilled the fundamental basis of legitimacy of the operation of a Leninist vanguard—the collective (democracy, the masses, etc.) could not exercise authority without the center (the leadership core—CPC, Central Committee, First Secretary, etc.) but as important, the core could not exercise authority without the authority of the collective. Each owed the other a firm duty. The development of Democratic Centralism along Leninist lines also required firm vigilance to avoid both Left and right error, but especially “left” error (Constitution of the CPC General Program).

These ideas were built into the structures of CPC organization as well as the development of the state apparatus especially from the start of the Deng Xiaoping Era. This was a time when it was important to fully develop a robust collective. Indeed, the emphasis on and the development of the collective was in line with the overall CPC line of socialist modernization. It suggested primary importance of developing economic, social and political forces in an all around effort to modernize the state and its institutions. To that end, the error of feudalism, of dependence on a Fuhrer, were to be avoided as the CPC sought to correctly develop the potential of its people.

Now China has elected to recognize the start of another, a Xi Jinping New Era. That was announced during the course of the 19^th CPC Congress in October 2017 and the process of realigning the state and the CPC to the realities of this New Era. Xi Jinping Though has been announced, and no doubt will be further elaborated through the end of this New Era. To align state and Party with the insights of the New Era, both State and CPC constitutions have been amended. Those amendments were essential expressions of one of the main themes of the New Era—the operation of state and Party through and within a cage of regulation.

It is in this light that one might consider the 2018 changes to the Chinese Communist Party Constitution that speak to the practice of democratic centralism in the CPC itself, and thus the relationship of the democratic mass of the Party to its leadership, however constituted from time to time. It also suggests the extension of the core-collective binary relation at the heart of democratic centralism from the intra-Party structures to the organization of social and political life in other respect. That suggests a further evolution of the Leninist notions of collectivity that have been developing in China, the exact expression of which in the New Era remains to be seen. It remains to be seen how these advances in the practice of Leninism in the New Era with Chinese characteristics will further develop the core concept of democratic centralism, and then from the CPC core guide its application to the collectives at all levels. But it does suggest a vigorous engagement with the fundamental principles of political organization that is both theoretically progressive and largely consistent with the core normative principles on which the Chinese state is founded.

十九大修改的党章和近来修改的宪法见证了中国共产党的集体领导在理论和时间上的一次阔步前进，当下，这个中国的先锋政党已经走过了其最初的革命极端和制度建设阶段。这些修改仍与民主集中制这一重要的列宁主义理念一脉相承并且有所发展。民主集中制在中国式列宁和注意发展历史的三个历史阶段中有着重要的地位。这三大历史阶段，即毛泽东时代（1949-1978）、邓小平时代（1978-2018）和习近平时代（2018之后），将民主集中制置于中国共产党运作方式的核心，并且也通过群众路线和国家机器的运行将其置于与人民关系的核心位置。

集体和核心的关系的演变是理解民主集中制的关键，也就是群众和党，所有党员和党中央的领导之间的关系。这种集体与核心的关系可以无限推广到国家、党、社会和经济生活中任何方面的中心组织原则上去。这些概念都与群众路线原则息息相关。因此民主集中制和群众路线实际上表述了同样一种列宁主义原则，这一原则向内指向中国工厂党，向外则指向广大人民群众。更重要的是，民主集中制同时也为列宁主义先锋政党运转的合法性根基打下了基础 — 如果没有中心（领导核心，即中国共产党，党中央，总书记，以此类推），集体（民主、群众等）将无法有效运作并行使权威；同样重要的是，相反，如果没有集体权威的支持，领导核心也无法有效运作并行使权威。集体和核心二者唇齿相依，相辅相成。民主集中制在列宁主义路线上的发展也要求党对左倾错误和右倾错误保持高度警觉，特别是左倾错误（中国共产党党章总纲。）

从邓小平时代的开端以来，这些思想都已整合进中国共产党组织结构和国家机构的发展之中。在这个时代，完全地打造一个强有力的集体是十分重要的。的确，对于集体的强调和发展都与中国共产党社会主义现代化的总体路线保持了一致。这也表明了通过发展政治、经济和社会等方面的全方位力量来实现国家和其机构现代化的重要性。这样说来，由于中国共产党寻求正确地发挥其人民的潜力，其将规避掉过分依赖元首的封建主义错误。

现在中国已经认识到其习近平新时代的开端。这是在2017年10月中共十九大期间宣布的，将国家和党整合进这新时代的现实中去的进程已然开始。尽管这一概念已经被公开宣布，毫无疑问的是其含义将不断细化直到其走到尾声。为了让国家和党都与新时代的发展相协调，党章和宪法都作出了相应修改。这些修改是新时代主旋律的根本表达，即国家和党在规则的笼子里面的运作。

也正是在这一语境下，我们可以认为十九大中国共产党党章的变化是针对中国共产党本身的民主集中制实践的。

这也说明了民主集中制原则关键的核心-集体二元关系从党内结构到其他方面的社会政治生活的延伸。同时也说明了中国的列宁主义集体概念的更深入发展，针对这一发展的准确表达仍有待明确。有待明确的还有这些进步奖如何在新时代具有中国特色的列宁主义实践中更深入地发展民主集中制的核心概念，并且从中国共产党领导核心引导至各级集体之中去。不过这次修改的确指出了如何在政治组织的根本原则指导下积极探索前进，也就是既在理论上循序渐进又与中国国家所基于的核心规范性原则始终保持较大程度的一致

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Extended Version

The Chinese Communist Party has been at the vanguard of advancing a correct understanding of the Leninist theory of collective leadership of a Communist Party, one that remains suitable for contemporary historical stages of development and one that is sensitive to the national context in which the obligations of leadership must be undertaken. The recent amendments to the Constitutions of the Communist Party and to the State Constitution in the wake of the 19^th Congress of the CPC evidence another great leap forward in the theory and practice of collective leadership by a vanguard party that has moved beyond its initial revolutionary stages and institution building stages.

The recent amendments suggest both continuity and development of the key Leninist concept—democratic centralism. Its development is also at the core of the differences between the development of European and Asian Marxist-Leninist theory. Democratic centralism has been the lynchpin of the development of Chinese Leninism over the course of its three eras of historical development. Those three eras, the Mao Zedong Era (1949-1978), the Deng Xiaoping Era (1978-2018) and the Xi Jinping Era (from 2018) put democratic centralism at the center of the working style of the CPC, of the relationship between core and collective within the CPCP, and of the relation of the two with the people through the mass line and the operation of the state apparatus.

In the transition from the Mao to the Deng Eras, Deng Xiaoping famously described the essence of democratic centralism

Later, Comrade Mao Zedong’s theory of Party building was developed further. In 1957 he summed up our aim as follows: “Our aim is to create a political situation in which we have both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and thus to promote our socialist revolution and socialist construction, make it easier to overcome difficulties, build a modern industry and modern agriculture more rapidly and make our Party and state more secure and better able to weather storm and stress.” Of course, Comrade Mao Zedong was discussing a political situation that should prevail not only in the Party but also in the army and among the people of the whole country. To repeat, this kind of political situation should prevail in the whole Party, in the whole army and among the whole people. . . . We must create a political situation in which the whole Party, army and people are united under the leadership of the Central Committee and in which we have “both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness”, a situation in which we can place all problems on the table for discussion and people can criticize the leading comrades when they think it necessary. (Deng Xiaoping, that “Mao Zedong Thought Must Be Correctly Understood As An Integral Whole” (July 21, 1977)).

This development was essential to the forward movement of the CPC’s working style from that appropriate to a revolutionary party out of power, through a vanguard party establishing its core institutional structures in which the essential contradiction was class struggle, to a CPC charged with the implementation of socialist modernization in which the essential contradiction was bound up in the development of productive forces.

The development of Democratic Centralism along Leninist lines also required firm vigilance to avoid both Left and right error, but especially “left” error (Constitution of the CPC General Program). Right error in democratic centralism would move CPC organization toward democracy without centralism. It is a movement toward parliamentary democracy without objective (e.g., the use of power to move the nation toward the establishment of a communist society which is at the core of Leninism). Leftist error tends toward the celebration of the core and the withering of the collective. Leftist error thrives on the cult of personality. It treats the collective as an object of obedience and as a means toward the perpetuation of personal power bound up in an individual who steals for himself the essence of collectivity—like Saturn eating his children. But cults of personality also may produce rightist error as well—in the form of a return to pre-capitalist feudal relationships—and in that sense cults of personality and the celebration of a core without a robust collective becomes the essence of the reactionary element in Leninist thought. The CPC itself has cautioned that Leninism has more to fear from leftist error and rightist error but cautions against both. And the double threat of cults of personality are especially sensitive. (CPC Constitution General Program).

Two related but distinct elements are sometimes intertwined when one thinks about the organization of Chinese governance. The first touches on the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party–its internal and self reflexive constitution along socialist democratic anti-cult of personality Principles. The second touches on the external relationships between this Vanguard Party, in its leadership role, and its partners through the administrative mechanisms of government.

Both of these elements share an important normative element–the centrality of collective action. Collective action itself describes an evolving concept at the core of Leninist theory for the operation of legitimate vanguard political organizations that mean to retain an authoritative leadership role . That notion of collectivity has evolved from the time of its first manifestations in early post revolutionary Marxist Leninist states. These were marked by a crude interpretation of democratic centralism tied to the linchpin of a charismatic (and sometimes less charismatic) leader whose cult of personality sometimes subsumed the collective character central to a legitimate Leninist organization within his (never “hers” to date) own body.

Modern Leninist theory rejects the notion that a vanguard party cannot exist except as manifested through a single leader serving at his pleasure. The healthy development of a more collectivist and internally democratic post revolutionary and governing vanguard party has seen its greatest development in China. China’s own constitution appears to reject the notion of cult of personality–of a leader who hijacks the vanguard, and swallowing it like a piece of cake declares himself its singular manifestation. This ought to be so even as particular personalities assume a position at the core of leadership, and leaders assume a core element of Party governance.

The 2018 revisions to the Chinese Communist Party Constitution now speak to both the identification of a single individual as a “core” element of leadership but also remind that “core” of his place within a collective leadership, and that this leadership is itself embedded within an organization that it serves. The revised provision of the expression of the leadership of the CPC through the principle of democratic centralism was amended to read (in English) as follows:

In building itself, the Party must work with firm resolve to meet the following five fundamental requirements.

Resolve in upholding democratic centralism. Democratic centralism combines centralism built on the basis of democracy with democracy under centralized guidance. It is both the Party’s fundamental organizational principle and the application of the mass line in everyday Party activities. The Party must fully encourage intraparty democracy, respect the principal position of its members, safeguard their democratic rights, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at every level and all Party members. Correct centralism must be practiced; all Party members must keep firmly in mind the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, uphold the leadership core, and keep in alignment, and firmly uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, so as to ensure the solidarity, unity, and concerted action of the whole Party and guarantee the prompt and effective implementation of the Party’s decisions. The Party shall strengthen and regulate political activities within itself; make intraparty political activities more politically oriented, up-to-date, principled, and effective; cultivate a positive and healthy intraparty political culture; and foster a sound political ecosystem featuring honesty and integrity within the Party. In its internal political activities, the Party shall conduct correctly criticism and self-criticism, engage in debate over matters of principle, and uphold truth and rectify mistakes. The Party shall work hard to create a lively political situation featuring both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, and both unity of will and personal sense of ease. (Emphasis supplied)

New to the development of democratic centralism in the New Era is an emphasis on the “core” of things–the core of leadership, the core of a specific individual at the core of leadership, the core of the CPC in leading the people and the like. The notion of a core remains to be developed fully but it appears to suggest a hierarchy of influence and authority with respect to which the core occupies the higher place. In the context of democratic centralism, the refined notion of a core appears to suggest a much more precise location of the authority of “the center” within democratic deliberation. It implies not merely the authority to guide, but also the authority to decide on the basis of the deliberations of those ranked below the core int he exercise of a guided deliberation with respect to matters under consideration.

There is thus a double guidance now implied in the concept of democratic centralism. The first is the authority of the core to guide the scope and form of deliberation (the boundaries of the exercise of democracy within the CPC). The second is the authority of the core to adopt a position in the wake of this deliberation that then must be adhered to by the CPC and which then represents the expression of CPC leadership outward in its external relations with the masses and in the state apparatus with respect to a particular matter. That double guidance, now is much more clearly centered on multiple cores that spread out from the core of the leadership, to the leadership as core, to the CPC as core. Thus both the notion of leadership is understood still as grounded in collective deliberation, but that leadership itself is also now manifested within a hierarchically arranged series of ever widening collectivities. The larger the collective the more subject to the leadership and guidance of the collective placed above it–all the way to the core (now it appears a single human being) at the core of the highest organization of collective leadership.

One gets a sense of this vertically arranged repeating pattern of core and collective in what appears to be the central amendment to the CPC Constitution provision set out above:

Correct centralism must be practiced; all Party members must keep firmly in mind the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, uphold the leadership core, and keep in alignment, and firmly uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, so as to ensure the solidarity, unity, and concerted action of the whole Party and guarantee the prompt and effective implementation of the Party’s decisions.

There are a number of ways of understanding this development of the core Leninist notion of collectivity in the organization of the vanguard party and the legitimacy of its leadership obligations to help bring society toward the realization of a communist society. At their extremes each interpretation comes close to the sort of “leftist” and “rightist” error that itself constitutes a breach of the fundamental line (and obligation) of the CPC as a whole. The CPC Constitution warns that:

The Party must ensure that reform and opening up are carried out in unity with the Four Cardinal Principles, put its basic line into effect in all fields of endeavor, and combat all mistaken tendencies of the “Left” and Right, maintaining vigilance against Rightist tendencies, but primarily defending against “Leftist” tendencies.

Perhaps a rightist error would be to read in this change a movement back toward feudalism–that is that democratic centralism tied to leadership cores moves the role of the CPC from its basic political work of moving toward a Communist society to the work of preserving the power of these cores as a new aristocracy. This effective abandonment of CPC objectives would of course strip the vanguard of its legitimacy and constitute a rightist putsch. More to be feared perhaps is an interpretation that reads into this revision a return to the leftist errors of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is not of nothing that the CPC constitution warns more against Leftist than Rightist error. Leftist error tends constitutes a core breach of CPC duty and adherence to its Basic Line primarily because it represents a fundamental betrayal of the core notion of socialist modernization, of the CPC’s fundamental obligation to move the country forward. To return to old ways of doing things, to retry the behaviors and patterns of a stage of Chinese history that has now long past, to relive the past, even a Leninist past, is not merely ideological error but also betrays the other core value–to seek truth from facts. And the facts of the fatal history of European Marxist Leninism to which such an interpretation would inevitably lead suggests a road to the destruction rather than the fulfillment of the Leninist obligation of the vanguard.

These issues are especially relevant in the wake of the proposed changes to the Chinese constitution that are being considered int he wake of the changes to the CPC Constitution after the 19th CPC Congress in October 2017. A much discussed amendment would lift the term limits for China’s president and vice president (here). Read together with the changes to the CPC Constitiuon’s notions of core and collective at the heart of the principle of democratic centralism, it has caused much speculation about the extent to which such amendment promotes “rightist” or “leftist” error (e.g., here, here, and here).

Yet none of this is set in stone. Moreover this evolving expression of Leninist collectivity, this refinement of the notion of centrality and democratic participation within levels of leadership, also leaves questions open for further development, might be more usefully read within the context of a long development of the intellectual idea of the form and exercise of collective leadership with Chinese characteristics. To that end it may be useful to re-consider Hu Angang’s Collective Presidency in China (2014), which I considered in “Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy for China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State,” Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 16(1):29-82 (2014). Chinese language version为21世纪的中国设计社会主义民主理论：中国宪政国家兴起语境下对胡鞍钢“集体领导制”理论的思考，Tsinghua University Journal (2015).

One of the most interesting variations of this approach within Chinese constitutional discourse is the notion of collectivity in the decision-making structures of Party and state in China. Hu Angang has most recently drawn on this general theory of democratic governance through collective action, and more especially on its theory of socialist democracy organized around a collective presidency. He is part of a line of theorists who are developing a theory of democracy that looks beyond the exercise of elections to the exercise of power within state and political entities. Hu suggests that if the ideal of a constitutionalist state is the exercise of democracy through representative and accountable institutions of governance, then it is possible to implement that ideal both by focusing on popular elections (traditional view) and by increasing responsive democracy within governmental and political institutions (Chinese socialist democracy). In both systems, the core democratic principle of legitimate constitutionalism is exercised. In one case (Western democracies), democracy is operationalized through the exercise of the franchise to elect leaders. In the other case (Chinese democracy), democracy may be embedded in the exercise of democratic and representative practices within the institutions of state — and as a critical part of the operation of the democratic functions of the party in power in one-party (or vanguard party) constitutional states.31 Either way, systems are instituted that enhance rule of law governance grounded in principles that reflect the political community as a whole in whose collective interests the representatives act. Yet Hu understands that “in almost 200 countries around the world, the personal presidential system is known, but the notion of a collective presidential system is not. This innovative practice by China is poorly understood, and it is not one that foreigners agree with.” (Ibid, pp. 36-38).

The fundamental principle that emerges engages in the relationship between the “core” and the “collective.” It suggests a balancing of mutual engagement in which the overall principles of CPC guidance of the masses is then reflected in the guidance elements of each of the levels of the organization of the CPC itself. But guidance is itself a contestable term–one can guide without consultation, inverting the operation of democratic centralism–and thus commit a leftist error endemic to the old Soviet Union and modern Cuba. Or one can understand the relationship of core and collective within the CPC itself as demanding the core to listen and well as lead, and to take the democratic part of democratic centralism seriously. This leads to a delicate balancing, but one which an open and robust CPC organization might fairly easily learn to navigate. Indeed, “the ideal of a collective presidency has wider implications for the ordering of the CCP’s internal democracy and the decision-making structures of the state organs. . . . To that end, the CCP has not concluded its task of better embracing the insights and obligations embedded in its mass line. The political work of naturalizing socialist democracy with the Chinese people remains a task as important in China as the equivalent task of civic education has been important in the West for a long time.” (Ibid., pp. 81-82).

The co-equality of core and collective as the foundational element of the principle of democratic centralism then encapsulates all of the binaries that together constitute the constellation of Leninism within this new Xi Jinping Era. Leninism requires a core in pyramidally ascending forms: from the mass of the CPC, ultimately to the leader of the standing committee (and the president of the PRC itself). But Leninism is an empty vessel without an equally powerful collective. A core with a collective is a dictatorship or autocracy of individuals—the worst sort of rightist error. A collective without a core produces anarchy and when coupled with socialist populism produces leftist error of the worst sort. The core disciplines the collective and helps it to know itself well enough to continue to fulfill its fundamental obligations as a Leninist vanguard. The collective ensures that the core serves the collective rather than himself—that each core fulfills the grave obligation of stewardship (in the Leninist sense of articulating and guiding the work of the collective). The collective, then, disciplines the core. The collective ensure that the core avoids the fundamental error of cult of personality. The core ensures that the collective does not fall into the error of bureaucratism.

Chinese bureaucracy in its present form has characteristics of its own. That is, it differs from both the bureaucracy of old China and that prevailing in the capitalist countries. It is closely connected with our highly centralized management in the economic, political, cultural and social fields, which we have long regarded as essential for the socialist system and for planning. Our leading organs at various levels have taken charge of many matters which they should not and cannot handle, or cannot handle efficiently. . . Moreover, the power of the Party committees themselves is often in the hands of a few secretaries, especially the first secretaries, who direct and decide everything. Thus “centralized Party leadership” often turns into leadership by individuals. This problem exists, in varying degrees, in leading bodies at all levels throughout the country. Over-concentration of power in the hands of an individual or of a few people means that most functionaries have no decision-making power at all, while the few who do are overburdened. This inevitably leads to bureaucratism and various mistakes, and it inevitably impairs the democratic life, collective leadership, democratic centralism and division of labour with individual responsibility in the Party and government organizations at all levels. (Deng Xiaoping, On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership (August 18, 1980)).

Most important of all, it is a central Leninist structural principle that the core is selected from the collective (Ibid. (“we must take the long-term interest into account and solve the problem of the succession in leadership. As precious assets of the Party and state, the older comrades shoulder heavy responsibilities. Their primary task now is to help the Party organizations find worthy successors to work for our cause. This is a solemn duty.”)). Thus, at its core, bureaucratism and cults of personality are interconnected errors of Leninism, the indications that the co-equality of core and collective have become maladjusted and require structural rectification.

Mutual discipline of collective and core, and the preservation of their co-equality in the organization of state and Party, is articulated through a cage of regulation—a project well underway as the hallmark of the Xi Jinping New Era. But more importantly, it is propelled by the basic substantive principles of Marxism itself. The New Era will face its greatest challenge in this last respect—the cultivation of the ability to persuasively point out with conviction the ways in which their actions and guidance—and their suitability for leadership—are firmly and legitimately based on the core substantive principles of Marxism that are embedded in the CPC basic line and more generally in the General Program of the CPC Constitution. Both core and collective will have to ensure that they can convince the masses that they will not fall prey to the errors of cult of personality or to the errors of bureaucratism.

In that context, the changes in the governance structures of the CPC Constitution and the State Constitution can be better understood as an expression of developments of Leninism in China and its application to the working style of the CPC. These changes can be understood as the expression in governance of the principle of democratic centralism. And the principle of democratic centralism is itself understood as embodying the basic structural and power relationships between the equally necessary collective and their respective cores. But it also serves as a warning that the core commits the most basic error against New Era Leninism should he seek to usurp the role of the collective and to act in its name or to suggest that the core now embodies or can serve as a substitute or as the expression of the collective. That is a core that requires firm rectification. Likewise, the collective commits the gravest error against the New Era Leninist principle of democratic centralism should they seek to avoid the guidance of the core, to the extent that the core continues to evidence the highest fidelity both to their role as representative of the collective (exercised through the principle of the mass line rather than in the form of Western democratic representation), and to the mandatory vanguard principles of the CPC basic line.

Democratic Centralism, then, will likely serve as the defining concept of the development of Leninism in the Xi Jinping New Era. It will mark a substantial advancement of the important principle from both the Mao Zedong and the Deng Xiaoping Eras. The first Mao Zedong era received democracy centralism from European Marxism as practiced by the Soviet Union and its satellites. The second Deng Xiaoping era developed democratic centralism along the lines of the new contradiction of development of productive forces and of the requirements of collectivity bent to that purpose. The “New era” of Xi Jinping appears set on a course of developing democratic centralism as the fundamental relationship between core and collective at every level of social, political and economic organization. It will deeply embed the fundamental principles of democratic centralism in all of the working styles of state, of Party and of society. And it appears ready to invoke the organization of a cage of regulation to ensure protection against the severe errors of cults of personality and of bureaucratism that have required rectification in the past. The New Era of Xi Jinping will revive the core. But to strengthen the core, democratic centralism also requires strengthening the collective as a vigorous and autonomous element of Leninist vanguard governance.

The New Era approach to democratic centralism evidences this balance in its new historical era. Even as the term limits for the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the People’s Republic of China under the State constitution are eliminated, the focus on the need for succession and limits on appointment are amplified in the regulations of the CPC (中共中央办公厅关于印发《党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定》等三个法规文件的通知 [Notice of the General Office of the Communist Party of China on Issuing Three Laws and Regulations Documents, “Interim Provisions on Tenure of Leading Party and Government Cadres”]). Articles 6 and 7 are worth considering in that respect:

第六条党政领导干部在同一职位上连续任职达到两个任期，不再推荐、提名或者任命担任同一职务。

第七条党政领导干部担任同一层次领导职务累计达到15年的，不再推荐、提名或者任命担任第二条所列范围内的同一层次领导职务。根据干部个人情况和工作需要对其工作予以适当安排。

The West has taken notice of the changes in the State constitution without much consideration of the organizational changes within the organization of the CPC. The West tends to see Chinese constitutionalism in Western terms and thus focuses on the State constitution without considering the normative framework within which it exists. Thus the Western reaction–that the amendments permit the current head of the CPC to serve as President for life of the State is fairly incomprehensible within developing Leninist theory in China. To serve as President for life does not have the same meaning in China as it might in a Western liberal democracy. Rather, Leninist theory suggests to look not at the state but to the institution of the political apparatus for the construction of a sound balance between core and collective, of which a life “presidency” would serve as a bellweather.

Indeed, the change can be understood as quite consistent with the development of a sounder basis for Leninist theory within China. First, Leninism requires that the vanguard itself practice the principles of democratic centralism internally first, and then from out of that internal core, provide a template for the collective. Before the amendments proper Leninist approaches to governance had been inverted. Here one understands the relationship of the core and the collective differently—if the CPC is the core of the nation, then the state is the collective. In that respect, the foundational organizational and normative principles of political organization must be embedded in the core as a guidance to the collective. The amendments appear to move toward coherence in that respect. Second, the amendments appear to strengthen rather than weaken protection against cults of personality, and bureaucratism by migrating term limits form the state apparatus to the Party apparatus. The effect is to strengthen the regulatory cage within which democratic centralism can be practiced along New Era lines. Third, it suggests the contours of New Era Leninism under Xi Jinping Thought in the sense of more clearly delineating the basic separation of powers in China between the political authority of the CPC and the administrative authority of state organs. In that respect it is important to note the official justification for the elimination of term limits in the State constitution–that the CPC Constitution does not impose term limits for its Secretary General. The need for presidential terms to mirror that of the head of the CPC suggests my long held view that emerging Marxist constitutionalism is grounded in the supremacy of the CPC constitution (the political constitution of the nation) over that of the administrative constitution of the state (e.g., here).

It remains to be seen how these advances in the practice of Leninism in the New Era with Chinese characteristics will further develop the core concept of democratic centralism, and then from the CPC core guide its application to the collectives at all levels. But it does suggest a vigorous engagement with the fundamental principles of political organization that is both theoretically progressive and largely consistent with the core normative principles on which the Chinese state is founded.